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STATUTORY ESTATES IN PLACE OF AN ESTATE
TAIL.
Mr. Zane in a recent article" on Determinable Fees gave some
space to the problem of the character and validity of limitations
arising by statute upon the creation of an estate tail. Believing
that he by no means exhausted the possibilities of this branch of
his larger subject, I have ventured upon it in the hope of adding
somthing while his article is still fresh in the minds of readers.
I.
STATUTES.
There are to-day in Arkansas, Colorado, Missouri and Vermont
statutes concerning estates tail, in every respect material to the
present inquiry, identical with section 6 of the Illinois Act on
Conveyances.2 This last is as follows: "In cases where, by the
common law,8 any person or persons might hereafter become seized,
in fee tail, of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, by virtue of
any devise, gift, grant or other conveyance, hereafter to be made,
or by any other means whatsoever, such person or persons, instead
of being or becoming seized thereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and
adjudged to be, and become seized thereof, for his or her natural
life only, and the remainder shall pass in fee simple absolute, to
the person or persons whom the estate tail would, on the death of
the first grantee, devise, donee in tail, first pass, according to the
course of the common law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant or
conveyance."
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Of these the Missouri Act of 1825' seems to have been the
first. It remained in force in Missouri until 1845, when it was
so altered5 as to read that "upon the death of such grantee or
devisee [in tail], the said lands and tenements shall go and be
vested in the children of such grantee or devisee, equally to be
divided between them, as tenants in common in fee; but if there
be only one child, then to that one in fee; and if any child be dead,
the part which would have come to him or her, shall go to his or
her issue, and if there be no issue, then to his or her heirs."'
In 1866,7 however, the Missouri Lgislature restored the Act of
1825 to the statute book. In 1827,8 Illinois copied the Missouri
Act of 1825 and this law has remained without change in force
in that state.10 In Arkansas the statute appeared first in 1837 :11
in Vermont in 1840; 12 and in Colorado in 1867 .13 In these three
states the statute has remined in force since its first passage in
its present form. 1"
Suppose then real estate be limited, in a state where such a
statute is in force, to A and the heirs of his body, remainder to
B and his heirs. Two groups .of problems arise: one with respect
to the statutory remainder; the other as to the remainder expressly
limited after the estate tail.
II.
THE STATUTORY REMAINDER.
Uncertainty and conflict among the authorities suggests inquiry
upon the following points respecting the statutory remainder:
Ist. Is is vested or contingent? 2nd. If it be held to vest in a
child of the donee in tail as soon as such child is born, is it sub-
ject to be divested if the child die before the death of the donee?
3rd. In whom does the remainder vest? 4 th. Does the Rule in
Shelley's case apply to it?
I. It is, agreed that so long as there is no issue of the body
of the donee in tail the statutory remainder is contingent.15 The
difficulty arises where issue have been born. Do they take a vested
remainder or one contingent upon their surviving the donee and
being his heir?
There would seem to be a very obvious difficulty with holding
the, remainder in fee to the heirs of the body of the donee in
tail a vested remainder at any time prior to the death of the donee
in tail. The statute expressly limits the remainder in fee to the
".person or persons whom the estate tail would, on the death
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of the first grantee, devisee donee in tail, first pass, according to
the course of the common law, by virtue of such devise, gift, grant
or conveyance." Now at common law it was impossible to ascer-
tain to whom the estate would pass until the death of the donee
in tail, since by the course of the common law the estate tail at
that time passed regularly by descent to the first tenant in tail's
heir at law provided such heir at law was of the issue of the body
of the tenant in tail.'6 The remainder then was clearly subject to
a condition precedent and the conditional element was incorporated
into the description of the remainder-man. 17 The case under the
English authorities would be one of the typical examples of a
contingent remainder.'
The Illinois Supreme Court seems at present to incline strongly
toward the doctrine that the remainder is vested'9 upon the ground
that a remainder is vested at any time if there is, "at that time,
a person ready and entitled to take possession as remainder-man,
should the particular estate then determine, although, should the
particular estate determine at some other time, such person might
not be entitled to the remainder."
2 0
With regard to the Missouri cases it is important to observe that
where the conveyance involved was governed by the law as it stood
from 1845 to i866 results might properly be reached which were of
very doubtful propriety under the Missouri statute in force from
1825 to 1845 and again from i866 to the present time. Mr. Zane
seems to have overlooked this, for he states the Missouri law
under the definition of a vested remainder suggested above
the issue as soon as any issue comes into being." In support of this
he cites Garth v. Armold,2' a case where the conveyance was con-
trolled by the law as it stood in 1855. In this view the case is
perfectly sound, for the statute in force at that time expressly pro-
vided that the remainder "shall go and be vested in the children
of such grantee, or devisee, equally to be divided between them,
as tenants in common in fee." Curiously enough Mr. Zane's over-
sight did not altogether mislead his readers as to the actual state
of the law in Missouri, for it had been held in Frame v. Hum-
phreys 22 that the remainder vested as soon as any child was born
to the donee, the Missouri Court apparently adopting the same
definition of a vested remainder which obtains in Illinois.
2. Even the hypothesis that the statutory remainder is vested
under the definition of a vested remainder suggested above,
it is clear that upon principle it should be subject to
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a condition subsequent, so that should the remainder-man
die before the death of the donee in tail his vested remainder would
be divested in favor of such person as should actually answer the
description of heirs of the body of the donee in tail at the donee's
death. If this be not so-if the remainder be not only vested
but indefeasible, then, instead of a gift to "the person or persons
whom the estate tail would, on the death of the first grantee, devisee
donee in tail, first pass, according to the course of the common
law," there will be in reality a remainder to the "children" of the
donee.
In Missouri and Illinois where there is a tendency to hold the
remainder vested, there is also an inclination to hold it inde-
feasible. But the authorities in each state are not altogether har-
monious upon the point.
In Illinois there is an interesting alternation of dicta in favor
of divesting the remainder and decision against it. In Butler v. Hues-
tis" the Court said "Mrs. Huestis [the donee in tail] under our
statute, would take a life estate in the property and the remainder
would pass in fee simple absolute to her children, although it
might open to let in after born children, and be divested as to such
as should die before the determination of the life estate." Yet in
Voris v. Sloan, 24 the preceding case in the same volume of re-
ports, the Court actually held the remainder indefeasible by declar-
ing it error in a decree not to recognize that upon the death of two
children of the donee without issue surviving, the children's share
descended to their mother, the donee in tail, as well as to the other
children. Still later, in Lehndorf v. Cope2 5 we have a clear cut
dictum of Mr. Justice Shope that the remainder though vested is
subject to be divested. Speaking of this statutory remainder he
says: "The person to whom the remainder is limited is ascertained,
the event upon which it is to take effect is certain to happen, and
although it may be defeated by the death of such person before the
determination of the particular estate, it is a vested remainder."
However, subsequently in Welliver v. Jones" the Court again
held squarely that the remainder was not subject to be divested
so that when the sole lineal heir of the donee dies without leaving
issue in the life of the donee the remainder passed by descent to
her collateral heirs, viz. her mother the donee, and half brothers
and sisters who were children of the donee's husband's first wife.
Still later, in Kyner v. Boll, 27 there is an express recognition of the
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propriety of the result reached in Voris v. Slow; aiod Welliver v.
Jones. Thus the direct authorities in Illinois stand.
There is another line of cases however, which indirectly indicates
that the Illinois Supreme Court has not unqualifiedly given itself
over to the idea that the statutory remainder is in, terms to the
"children" of the donee. Where the limitations are to A for life,
remainder to the heirs of the body of A, it has been continuously
asserted that the rule in Shelley's case had no application,2 until,
in two quite recent cases,20 the application of the rule is not even con-
sidered. Now the only ground for saying that the Rule in Shelley's
case does not apply here is that if it did A would take a life estate
with a remainder in tail to A, which by the doctrine of merger
would give A an etsate tail and this by the statute on entails would
be turned back into the estates as they were originally created, viz.,
a life estate to A with a contingent remainder in fee to his lineal
heirs.30 It is apparent enough then that if by the statute on en-
tails the statutory remainder runs to the "children" so that they
have not only a vested, but an indefeasible interest as soon as
born, there is no reason why the Rule in Shelley's case should not
be applied.
In this state of the Illinois authorities Mr. Zane's statement
of the Illinois law is open to some objections: First, he undertakes
to say quite positively what the law is. Second, judged by what
seems to be a clear preponderence of direct'authority he states it
incorrectly. He says, "If the issue dies in the lifetime of the first
taker, its share descends only to its issue, and not to the heir gen-
eral of the deceased child, and if it dies without issue during the
lifetime of the first taker, that particular issue is eliminated, and
at the death of the donee in tail the issue then living take the re-
mainder in fee." If the view that the remainder is not only vested
but indefeasible and the actual result of Voris v. Sloan and Welliver
v. Jones are to prevail, then this statement is incorrect, since it
was the distinct result of that view and the holding of those cases
that upon the death of a child of the donee in the donee's lifetime
without issue, the child's vested remainder descended to its collat-
eral heirs. Third, Mr. Zane has failed to perceive that his own
statement would be perfectly correct if the view prevailed that the
statutory remainder, though vested, was subject to be divested.
On this hypothesis, if the donee's child is dead with issue at the
death of the donee, and those take the remainder who are the
donee's lineal heirs by the statute on descent, then by that statute
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the issue of a deceased child stands in such deceased child's place31
and take as lineal heirs-not of the child, but of the donee. If
on the other hand the child of the donee dies without issue then
the other children take the remainder as the lineal heirs of the
donee. Mr. Zane's own explanation of the significance of the re-
sults contained in his statement is quite different. "It thus ap-
pears," he says, "that during the lifetime of the donee the remainder
to the issue is treated as an estate tail; it becomes a fee simple
upon the death of the donee in tail. If no issue survive the donee,
the other remainder in fee takes effect. It thus appears that there
is one species of estate tail upon which the statute has no effect."
From this he would appear to believe that the statutory remainder
is sometimes subject to be divested and sometimes not-that if the
donee's child dies leaving issue the vested remainder of the child
becomes indefeasible and then there is a descent to the issue of
the child, while if the child die leaving no issue the remainder is
subject to be divested in favor of the other children. This, it is
submitted, states the law worse than it really is. It adds to a
subject already unnecessarily overloaded with artificial and com-
plex distinctions, a refinement which finds no support in the lan-
guage of the statute upon which it must be supposed to rest.
The Missouri cases must be examined with special care, for if
the case be governed by the law as it stood there from 1845 to 1866
the statutory remainder is n6t only vested but it is either not subject
to be divested at all and so may pass by descent to the heirs general
of the child of the donee, or, if subject to be divested, it is in the
manner pointed out by the statute, i.e., in favor of the issue of a
deceased child of the donee, or if there be none, then in favor of
the collateral heirs of such child. Mr. Zane's failure to observe
this has caused him to state the law under the Missouri statutes in
force from 1845 to I866 as if it were the law of Missouri under the
statute similar to the one quoted at the beginning of this article,
which was in force from 1825 to 1845 and from 1866 to the pres-
ent time. He cites Garth v. Arnold 2 decided with reference to the
Missouri Act of 1845 (referred to in the case as in R. S. 1855)
and from it states the law generally for Missouri to be that, "if
a child dies without issue before the first taker, the vested re-
mainder is not thereby divested, but the heirs of the deceased
child take." Again, however, Mr. Zane did not entirely mislead
his readers as to the actual state of the law under the present
statute, for in Frame v. Humphreys8 the Missouri Court seems
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squarely to have held that the remainder could not be divested in
such a case. It is difficult, nevertheless, to regard the Missouri
law as settled this way until the earlier case of Rozier v. Graham,"'
where, if the remainder was not actually held contingent, it was at
least held subject to be divested, be expressly overruled.
3. In whom does the remainder vest? This involves two other
questions: (a) Is the remainder in those who are the lineal heirs
of the donee according to Blackstone's canons or according to mod-
em statutes of Descent? (b) Assuming that lineal heirs under
ihe modem statute take the remainder, can you restrict them to a
special class in the case of an estate tail special?
(a) In Arkansas, 5 Illinois, 36 and Vermont37 it seems clear
that the remainder under the statute vests in such issue of the
donee in tail as are his heirs under the statute on descent. In all
the cases the point is assumed, no other view being suggested.
It is hard to say that this is not a proper result, and yet there are
difficulties with it. The holding is preciesely one of those which
the Court ought to have justified when it was pronounced to be
the law so as to put forever at rest doubts based upon very plausi-
ble reasoning. According to the language of the statute the re-
mainder in fee is limited "to the person or persons whom the
estate tail would, on the death of the first grantee, devisee donee
in tail, first pass, according to the course of the common law."
It is perfectly clear that the descent if traced literally "according
to the course of the common law," must have followed such of
Blackstone's canons38 as are applicable to lineal descent. (2)
The male issue shall be admitted before the female. (3) Where
there are two or more males in equal degree, the eldest only shall in-
herit, but the females altogether. (4) The lineal descendants,
in infinitum, of any person deceased shall represent their ances-
tor: that is, shall stand in the same place as the person himself would
have done had he been living. Thus, the eldest son alone, if
there were one, would take the remainder in fee, and the rule of
primo-geniture would have survived to the present day in this one
case. Such a conclusion is not so impossible as it might at first
sight seem. It was in fact adopted in two Missouri cases. 9  In
the more recent one the Court said: "That under this statute, by
the grant in the deed, to Mary A. Walker and the heirs of her body,
she took only a life estate, is beyond dispute. The serious question
is, to whom did the other part, the remainder in fee simple abso-
lute, go? The answer of the statute is, to the persons to whom the
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estate tail would on her death first pass according to the common
law, by virtue of the grant. This grant being of a fee tail general,
according to the common law, its course by that law is similar,
so far as it goes, to that of an estate in fee simple (Williams, R. P.
120, 17 Int. Ed.), and as at the date of the grant there were living
sons and daughters of the said Mary A. Walker, of whom John D.
Walker was the eldest, and as to him the estate tail would first
pass on the death of his mother according to the common law (I
Cooley's Black., 4 Ed. bottom pp. 605 and 6o6), to him the re-
mainder in fee simple absolute passed under the statute by virtue
of the grant, * * *."40
There would seem to be only two possible grounds for reaching
a different resuilt: First, that a modem statute changing the com-
mon law mode of descent had, prior to the statute on entailments,
altered the course of descent in cases of estate tail and that the
act concerning entails in referring to "the course of the common
law" really referred to the common law as modified by the mod-
em statute. Second, that a statute of descent passed subsequent
to the act regarding entails by implication modified it so that "ac-
cording to the course of the common law" must be read "according
to the statute of descent."
An examination of the statutory history of Illinois will show
how difficult it is, in that state at least, to sustain the results of
the cases there, upon either of the grounds suggested.
At the time the Act of 1827 concerning entails was passed, there
had been in force in Illinois as a territory and as a state since 1787
a statute changing the common law course of lineal descent so that
children and descendants of a deceased child shared in equal parts,
the descendants of a deceased child or grandchild taking the share
of their deceased parent in equal parts among them.4 1 Did these
acts change the course of descent in the case of an estate tail?
And if so did the act of 1827 refer to the course of descent as
changed by them?
It is clear that the first statutes of descent were not in terms
confined in their application to estates in fee simple, for they begin:
"That the estates of both resident and non-resident proprietors
* * dying intestate shall descend." "Proprietors" is a word
which might well have included holders of an estate tail. An ex-
amination, however, of some early cases in Massachusetts, 42 Penn-
sylvania,43 and Maine44 will seem to indicate a strong tendency to
hold that the modern statutes concerning descent, even when they
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are not in terms confined to estates in fee simple,4 5 do not apply
to estates tail so that the descent there still continues to be to the
eldest son, etc., according to the course of the common law.4 6 But
from a careful examination of these cases it will appear that the
results reached were influenced by a long period of recognition of
estates tail and their descent according to the common law 7 and
a consequent disinclination to overrule by implication merely a
settled rule of property.48 It may fairly be assumed, however, that
such considerations never could have influenced the Courts of Illi-
"nois and would not now do so. We may therefore assume for the
purpose of the present discussion that the Supreme Court of that
State would hold that the statutes of descent in force prior to 1827
did. apply to alter the course of descent of estates tail.40
Then we reach this question: Does the Act of 1827 in declaring
that the remainder shall pass "to the person or persons whom the
estate tail would, on the death of the first grantee, devisee donee
in tail, first pass, according to the course of the common law" mean
the common law as altered by previous statutes then in force? It
seems pretty hard to answer this question in the affirmative. The
common law and the statutory rules concerning descent were
radically different. The latter did away with the former and super-
ceded them. When therefore a new act was passed which referred
in terms to descent "according to the course of the common law"
the common law course of descent would seem to have been un-
equivocally distinguished and pointed out, and not a wholly different
statutory mode.50  This was the position taken by the Missouri
Court in the recent case of Frame v. Humphreys. There the Court
said: "Although the common law of descents was never in force
in this jurisdiction (Terr. Laws of Louisiana, 18o7 Cap. 39; Terr.
Laws of Mo. 1815 Cap. 143; R. S. 1825, p. 326; R. S. 1835, p. 222)
that law was, as we have seen, preserved in the statute of convey-
ances, not as a law of descent, but to the extent only and for the
single purpose of affording a rule for the delimitation of an estate
tail created by grant or devise * * *-51
It is difficult to say that the statute of 1829,52 concerning
descents operated in any way to alter the language of the Act of
1827 concerning entails. If it did so it must be by implication
merely. But there is no ground for any such implication since the
Act of 1827 deals completely with the subject of entails and the
subsequent statute concerning descent does not in terms, nor indeed
need it be regarded as in the slightest degree inconsistent with the
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Act of 1827. Subsequent events repel any inference that these
two acts are at all inconsistent with each other, since they have
been re-enacted in their original form in the subsequent revisions
of I845,"' and 1874.11
(b) Suppose, however, the general view to obtain that lineal
heirs of the donee under modem statutes on descent take the remain-
der in fee. Then take this case: To A and the heirs of his body
by his present wife B. A has had a former wife and dies leaving
children by both wives who are his heirs under the statute on de-
scefnt. It is held in Illinois at least that in such a case only the
lineal heirs of the donee by the particular wife will take.5 And it
seems to make no difference whether the Court regards the re-
mainder as contingent or as vested subject to be divested, 6 or vested
and indefeasible. 57  So if the limitation be to A and the heirs
male of his body, I suppose the remainder would be only to those
of A's heirs under the statute on descent as are males.
This result ought to be questioned if for no other reason to
show what liberties have been taken with this statute on entails.
By it the remainder is created in those to whom the estate tail
would on the death of the donee "first pass according to the course
of the common law." Now if you construe this to mean "according
to the course of the statute on descent," how can you support the
remainder in the restricted class of the donee's lineal heirs by a
particular wife? It is of no use to argue that the donor intended
the class to be limited, for the 'statute completely frustrates the in-
tention of the donor. It places statutory estates in place of the
estate limited and if the statute says that the remainder shall
be in those who are the donee's lineal heirs at the time of his death
according to the statute on descent, what is to be done but to allow
all the donee's lineal heirs to take? An excellent example of this
exact mode of handling the statute is to be found 'in some New
Jersey cases. A New Jersey statue of 1820,8 in terms created a
remainder in the "children" of the donee." It is clearly the law
under this statute that if an estate tail be limited to A and the
heirs of his body by a particular wife B, and he have no children
by B, but does have children by another and different wife, the
issue of such different wife will take the remainder in fee, because
the statute says "children" without distinguishing between special
classes of children.0 0 The Illinois cases which, while giving a re-
mainder to those who may be heirs of the donee according to the
statute on descent, restrict the class of such heirs as the donee has
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indicated simply point out the extreme liberty which a court may
take with the language of a statute.
4. If the statute on entails be held to create in effect a remainder
to the "children" of the donee which vests in each child indefeas-
ibly as soon as born, then of course the Rule in Shelley's case can
have no application.61 If the statute turns the estate tail into a
life estate in A with a remainder in fee to those who at A's death
would be his heirs at law either according to the statute on descent
or according to the course of the common law, and if the remainder
under such circumstances be regarded as one to which the Rule
in Shelley's case applies, yet by the operation of that rule and the
doctrine of merger A would have an estate tail again. The effect
then of applying the Rule in Shelley's case would be to nullify the
effect of the statute. It is properly enough held therefore upon
this ground, if on no other, that the statutory limitations resulting
from the creation of an estate tail cannot be subject to the opera-
tion of the Rule in Shelley's case.
2
III.
THE REMAINDER AFTER THE ESTATE TAIL.
The remainder after an estate tail was vested and valid. 3 What
then is the effect of the statutory estates upon this remainder? This
question must be looked at with reference to three cases: Ist-
Where there never has been any issue of the donee in tail to take
the statutory remainder; 2nd-Where, after the estate tail and
remainder are created, children are born to the donee; 3rd-Where
at the time the estates are created the donee in tail has children
or other issue. In respect to each of these three cases the question
must be asked upon two inconsistent hypotheses-that the gift after
the estate tail is upon a definite failure of issue and that it is upon
an indefinite failure of issue. Finally, it must be considered whether
the ultimate interest is upon a definite or indefinite failure of issue.
r. If at the time the estate tail is created no issue of the donee
are in existence the statutory remainder is contingent. If the ulti-
mate interest is to take effect upon a definite failure of issue it will,
upon the ground that the conditional element is incorporated with
the gift to the remainder-man, be a contingent remainder and the
case will be one of contingent remainders in fee in double aspect.
If the ultimate interest is to take effect upon an indefinite failure
of issue, it must do so as a shifting executory interest. However,
in the recent case of Chapin v. Vott 5 the ultimate interest was held
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to be a vested remainder. 6 This result was obtained by the appli-
cation of the New York statutory definition of a vested remainder.67
Is the ultimate future interest valid? It was clearly assumed
and held to be so in Chapin v. Nott. If it be regarded as a real
vested remainder so that the rule against perpetuities can have no
application there is no doubt about its validity. If the ultimate
interest be regarded as a contingent remainder upon a definite
failure of issue it is not too remote. It is submitted also that it
is valid as a contingent remainder on a definite failure of issue
even though the ultimate gift be looked upon as limited to take
effect on an indefinite failure of issue. It is clear that in the gift
on an indefinite failure of issue there is included in effect a
gift on a definite failure of issue if it occur. It is clear also
that upon the definite failure of issue the ultimate interest takes
effect as a contingent remainder, while upon the indefinite failure
of issue it must take effect as a shifting executory interest. Un-
der these circumstances the ultimate gifts upon the two different
contingencies may be separated by operation of law, so that the
ultimate gift will read as if it had been expressly limited to take
effect "if the donee dies without issue him surviving or without
issue in any generation."6 8  The shifting executory interest upon
the latter contingency is clearly void for remoteness. The contin-
gent remainder upon the former contingency is clearly valid.
2. Suppose now that after the estate tail is created the donee's
first child is born.
If in accordance with the proper definition of a contingent
remainder the statutory remainder was still contingent after the
birth of the donee's first child, then by the same definition of a
contingent remainder the ultimate interest, if upon a definite failure
of issue, would be a contingent remainder and both remainders
would take effect as contingent remainders in double aspect. If
the ultimate interest were upon an indefinite failure of issue then
it would be a shifting executory interest after a contingent remainder
in fee and clearly too remote; but the contingent remainder in fee
on a definite failure of issue contained in it and separable from it
would be valid enough.
If, however, upon the peculiar definition of a vested remainder
toward which the Illinois Court has inclined the interest after the
estate tail be held a vested remainder before the birth of issue to
the donee, then by the same definition the issue of the donee upon
birth take a vested remainder. What then happens to the remainder
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of the ultimate taker which was also vested? Certainly it must
lose its character as a vested future interest. You can hardly turn
it into a contingent remainder even if it be upon a definite failure
of issue because a contingent remainder after a vested remainder
in fee is impossible. It must then take effect if at all as a shifting
executory interest cutting short the vested remainder in fee to
the donee's issue. But this again is contrary to the settled principle
governing future interests that you cannot by events occurring subse-
quently to the creation of a contingent remainder turn it into an
executory interest.6 9  Upon what principle then can you turn a
vested remainder in fee into a shifting executory interest? Will
you say that the remainder after an estate tail was always destruc-
tible and that by the necessary operation of recognized principles
of future interests it is destroyed the moment the remainder in
fee vests in a child of the donee? Or will you attempt the intro-
duction of some innovation in the law of future interests in order
to support the interest after the estate tail so far as the rule against
perpetuities will permit? Will you say that before the donee has
issue the utlimate remainder-man has both a vested remainder in
fee subject to be divested and a shifting executory interest in fee?
Or shall a new rule of future interests be advanced, founded upon
the modern endeavor of courts in all cases to give effect to the
intention of the grantor or devisor, that any kind of a future
interest may be turned into any other kind at any time by any
event if necessary in order to carry out the intent of the creator
of the interests? It is not at all clear that the ultimate interest,
vested as a remainder before the birth of issue to the donee may
not be wholly destroyed by the mere birth of issue apart from any
question of remoteness, and quite regardless of whether the ulti-
mate interest is on a definite or indefinite failure of issue.
If means be found to hold the intended interest after the stat-
utory vested remainder in fee valid apart from the rule against
remoteness, such future interest must necessarily take effect if at
all as a shifting executory interest after a vested remainder in fee.
If it were upon a definite failure of issue it would be unobjectiona-
ble from the point of view of remoteness. If created by will it
would be an unobjectionable executory devise. If created in a deed
it would be void in Illinois under Palmer v. Cook.70 If the ulti-
mate interest is to take effect upon an indefinite failure of issue
it cannot be void for remoteness. It must take effect also in any
event as a shifting executory interest so there can be no ground
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for separating the ultimate interest into one upon a definite and
the other upon an indefinite failure of issue.
3. Suppose now that at the time when the estate tail and re-
mainder over are created the donee in tail has children.
If you adopt the view that the donee's children take a contin-
gent remainder, then the observations supra, respecting the case
where the donee has children born after the creation of the estates
and where the remainder to those children is regarded as contin-
gent, apply.
If you adopt the view that the children take at once a vested
remainder in fee, then the remainder after the estate tail can only
take effect as a shifting executory interest. If it be upon an indefinite
failure of issue it must be void for remoteness and there is no
ground for separating the contingencies. If it be upon a definite
failure of issue it will be unobjectionable on the ground of remote-
ness, but if created in a deed it must be void in Illinois under Palmer
v. Cook.71 If created in a will it will be an unobjectionable shift-
ing executory devise.
The recent case of Metzen v. Schopp72 clearly sustains this
last. There the testator devised to his wife for life with a remain-
der to his son, John Peter, in tail, and "in case of the death of my
son, John Peter Metzen, without leaving issue and after the death
of my wife" the property to be sold and the proceeds divided. It
was held that the son did not get a fee simple, but only a statutory
*life estate with a statutory remainder in fee "to the heirs of his
body." That was all that was involved, but the Court evidently, to
forestall further litigation, went out of its way to say that the
interest after the estate tail was limited upon a 4efinite failure of
issue, and intimated that it was a perfectly valid devise. The use
of the word "leaving" in the phrase "without leaving issue" made
it, upon the English cases respecting personalty73 and the Illi-
nois cases regarding realty as well,74 a gift on a definite failure of
issue. Then it appears that the son, John Peter, was married and
had issue before the testator died, which issue may fairly be assumed
to have been living at the testator's death. If then that child took
a vested statutory remainder in fee upon the death of the testator
the gift over upon trust to convert was a valid executory devise
upon a definite failure of issue when the testator died.
4. Up to this point questions raised respecting the remainder
after the estate tail have been considered upon two hypotheses-
that the ultimate interest was on a definite failure of issue and that
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it was on an indefinite failure of issue. It is apparent that the
results reached will in certain cases be different according as one
interpretation or the other is adopted. It is proper, therefore, that
some consideration should be given to this problem of construction.
Suppose estates be limited to A for life and if A die without
issue then to B in fee. A in that case takes an estate tail by a rule
of construction founded on the assumption that B's estate is upon
an indefinite failure in the issue of A.75 There would seem to be
a palpable absurdity in holding, in such a case, that B's interest
after the statutory estates into which the estate tail in A is turned
takes effect upon a definite failure of issue. If in a given juris-
diction there is in force a statute which declares that dying without
issue means primarily a definite failure of issue, then if that applies
the life estate in A cannot be turned into an estate tail. If it does
not apply it must be because by the context of the instrument it is
expressly indicated that an indefinite failure of issue is meant.
The life estate must then be enlarged into a fee tail and the in-
terest after it becomes one upon an indefinite failure of issue. In
Nott v. Fitzgibbon0 the Court seems to have performed the curious
process of holding that the rule which enlarged the life estate into
a fee and the statute which required "dying without issue" to mean
a definite failure of issue could both be applied to the same limita-
tions.
Suppose the estates to be limited to A and the heirs of his body
and "in the event that the said A dies without issue" then to B
and his heirs. This was the form of the gift in Chapin v. Nott.7
"In the event that A dies without issue," while not the most artistic
formula for limiting a remainder after an estate tail,78 was fully
effective for that purpose. Whatever difficulties may have arisen
in respect to this phrase in other cases there can be no doubt that
when used to limit a further interest after an estate tail it referred
to an indefinite failure of issue. So clearly was this in accordance
with the real intent of the grantor or devisor that when the Wills
Act 9 provided that the words "die without issue" should be con-
strued to mean a want or failuure of issue in the lieftime or at the
death of the person referred to and not an indefinite failure of
issue, it added this proviso among others: "unless a contrary inten-
tion shall appear by the will by reason of such person having a prior
estate tail." So strong is the inference from the context that the
limitation to B is expressed to be upon an indefinite failure of issue
that even if such a statute contained only the general exception
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
"unless a contrary contention shall appear," it might be held that
an indefinite failure of issue was meant. How then can the creation
of statutory estates in place of an estate tail alter that expressed
intent? The ultimate interest must still remain a gift over on an
indefinite failure of issue.
Grout v. TownsendA0 so far from holding the contrary, as Mr.
Zane evidently intends us to believe, seems rather to sustain this
view. The Court of Errors"' did say that even if the donee hi tail
took a fee under the statue, which was originally subject to be de-
feated by her dying without issue surviving at her death, yet it was
none the less alienable and the donee, having died leaving issue, it
never could be divested. Then it went on to say very pointedly
that the limitation over was void because to take effect upon an
indefinite failure of issue :82 "In determining that she [the donee]
took an estate in fee simple by force of the statute abolishing en-
tails, it follows of course that remainders limited to take effect upon
the failure of issue in tail are void."83
Statutes regarding entails of the sort dealt with have brought
up problems in the law of future interests in courts where the casual
character of the case has furnished but little incentive to either
judges or counsel to exercise that degree of learning demanded in
their solution. The result has naturally been the growth of a group
of premises from which the precise and certain deductions to which
the subject particularly lends itself are almost impossible. If all
the consequences of the statute had been perceived from the first
it is submitted that courts would more readily have reached the con-
clusion that the statutory remainder was contingent to "the person
or persons whom the estate tail would, on the death of the first
grantee, devisee donee in tail, first pass, according to the course of
the common law ;" that the interest after the estate tail took effect
as a valid contingent remainder on a definite failure of issue in the
donee, if the contingency was so expressed; that even if the ultimate
interest was .expressly declared to be upon an indefinite failure of
issue yet the gift on a definite failure of issue which it included
could still have been given effect as a valid contingent remainder
if the estates limited were legal and not equitable.
Albert Martin Kales.
Northwestern University, Law School, Chicago.
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APPENDIX.
17 Harvard Law Review, 297.
'R. S. 1874 Ch. 30, Sec. 6. Hurd's R. S. (1899) Ch. 30, Sec. 6.
'The present Missouri Statute (R. S. 1899, Vol. z, Par. 4592) reads,
"where by the Common or Statute law of England any person might become
seized in fee tail, * * * " so that it may be regarded as clearly referring
to estates tail created by the statute de donis of Edward I. The same con-
struction is put upon the language of the Illinois Statute: "The General
Assembly must have intended to refer to estates tail created by the statute
de donis. They speak of persons becoming seized of such estates by the
common law, when we have seen that estates tail grew out of the statute
de donis, and not out of the common law. * * * If, as is contended by
the defendants in error, the General Assembly intended to restore the common
law as it stood before the adoption of the statute de donis, they would simply
have repealed that statute, and left the donee with power, on the birth of
issue, to alien the estate, and re-purchase, and thus cut off both the remainder
and reversion." Per Walker, C. J., in Frazer v. Board of Supervisors, 74
Ill. 282, at pages 287, 288.
'R. S. 1825, Act concerning conveyances, Sec. 4; R. S. 1835, Act regu-
lating conveyances, See. 5.
5R. S. 1845, Act on conveyances, Sec. 5; R. S. 1855, Ch. 22, Sec. 5.
'Observe that the New Jersey Act of June 13th, I820 (Rev. Stat. 1821,
page 774, Sec. 2), was in substantially this form, giving the remainder in fee
to "children" of the donee. It seems to have continued in force in New
Jersey down to the present time. (Elmer's Digest, p. 130, Sec. 6; Stat. of
N. J. x874, p. 341, Sec. ii; Nixon's Digest 1709-,855, p. 196, Sec. ii; Gen'l
Stats. of N. J. 17o9-1895, Vol. 2, p. 1195, Sec. ii). Mr. Zane would seem
to have overlooked this in including (17 Harvard Law Review, 305, note 8)
New Jersey in his list of States which have statutes regarding estates tail
like that in force in Illinois and other States mentioned at the beginning of
this article.
'R. S. 1866, Ch. io8, Sec. 4; Wagner's Mo. Stat. 187o, p. 1351, par. 4;
Rt S. 1879, p. 675, par. 3941; R. S. I899, Vol. i, par. 4592.
'L. 1827, p. 95; 1 A. & D. R. E. S., p. 75.
'It would seem as if the Illinois Statute of 1827 must have been copied
from the Missouri Act of 1825. The two are absolutely identical in language,
except that the Illinois Act has omitted six words which in the Missouri
Statute make it apply to all estates tail created and existing at the time
when the act went into effect.
'*R. S. 1845, p. Io4; R. S. 1874, p. 273.
1R. S. 1837, p. i89, Ch. 31, Sec. 5.
1R. S. 184o, Ch. 59, Sec. i, p. 310.
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UR. S. 1867, Ch. 17, Sec. s.
1Arkansas: Sandels & Hill, Digest of Statutes 1894, p. 352, Ch. 29, See.
7oo. Vermont: G. L. 1862, Ch. 64, Sec. i, p. 446; V. S. 1894, Ch. 1O5, Sec.
22oI, p. 426. Colorado: R. S. 1877, Ch. 18, Sec. 6; Mill's Ann. Stats., Vol.
I, p. 584, Sec. 432 (89i).
'Frazer v. Board of Supervisors, 74 Ill. 282, 290; Atherton v. Roche,
192 Ill. 252, 257 (semble); Dinwiddie v. Self, 145 Ill. 290, 300 (semble).
"John de Mandeville's Case, Co. Lit. 26 b; 4 Gray's Cases on Prop., 9.
'
7 Gray on Rule against Perpetuities, par. lo8.
"Fearne C. R. 9; Fearne C. S. Smith's Notes, par 383-385; Leake, Digest
of Land Laws, p. 324; Challis, Real Property (2nd ed.), p. 12o. All these
writers state the typical case of a contingent remainder of Fearne's fourth
class to be to A for life, remainder to the right heirs of J. S., who are at that
time living. Challis says: " * * * the remainder cannot vest until the
ascertainment, or coming into being, of a person to satisfy the description
in the limitation; and in the case of limitations to the heirs of a living person,
such ascertainment can only take place upon his death; because nemo est
heres vivent'. It might at first sight be thought that the remainder is
vested in the heir presumptive or heir apparent; but as the heir is, by the
terms of the limitation, to take as a purchaser, and as the purchaser is to be
the person who in fact comes within the description of heir, it is clear that
the remainder cannot vest in the heir presumptive or apparent so long as
his heirship remains only presumptive or apparent, because such a person
may not, in fact, ever be the true heir at all, and therefore may never be
qualified, under the terms of the limitation, to take the estate at all."
Observe that the English writers had no occasion to deal with the case
of a limitation to A for life with a remainder to the heirs of A's body because
such a limitation would have been subject to the Rule in Shelley's Case.
"Boatman v. Boatman, 198 Ill. 414; Chapin v. Nott, 203 IIl. 341.
"Gray on Rule against Perpetuities, par. io6, iO7.
=1I15 Fed. Rep. 468.
=i64 Mo. 336. Observe, however, that in Rozier v. Graham, 146 Mo. 352,
and Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 284, 3o4, the Court was non-committal upon
whether the remainder was vested or contingent.
'68 Ill. 594, 598.
Z68 Ill. 588.
2122 Ill. 317, 331.
26I66 Ill. So.
" 182 III. 171, 177. There the Court, after stating that upon the birth of
Eugene, tre first child of the donee in tail. he took an estate in fee simple sub-
ject to the donee's life estate, and subject to open and let in after born children,
proceeded as follows: 'Vhen the child Eugene died before the birth of
another child, such fee so vested in him passed to his heirs-at-law, who were
his father and mother, subject to be divested pro tanto to let in after born
children."
"Butler v. Huestis, 68 Ill. 594, 599, 6oo; Voris v. Sloan, 68 Ill. S88, 590;
Griswold v, Hicks, 132 Ill. 494, 500.
'Welsch v. Welsch, 183 111. 237; Lancaster v. Lancaster, 187 Ill. 54o.
8 Such is the reasoning of Mr. Justice Shope in Lehndorf v. Cope, x22
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Ill. 317, 331. There the deed ran to "M. A. L. and her heirs by her present
husband, H. L." This was held to give M. A. L. a fee tail special at common
law which the statute on estates tail turned into a life estate to M. A. L.
and a remainder in fee to the bodily heirs of herself and her rusband. The
Court then said that even proceeding upon the supposition that M. A. L. took
a life estate by the original limitation in the deed the result would be the same,
since M. A. L by the Rule in Shelley's case "would, at common law, be seized
of an estate in fee tail, and brought directly within the terms of Section 6 of
the Conveyance Act.
ftr A. & D. R. E. S. 439; Laws i8ig, p. 223 (i A. & D. R. E. S. 446);
Laws 1829, p. 191 (1 A. & D. R. E. S., p. 464); R. S. 1845, Ch. lO9, Sec. 46
(i A. & D. R. F_ S. 5o5); Laws 1871-2, p. 352, Sec. I (I A. & D. R. E. S.
579): R. S. 1874, Ch. 39, par. I (Hurd's R. S. 19ol, p. 677).
nII5 Fed. Rep. 468 (C. C. A.).
3164 Mo. 336.
" 146 Mo. 352.
8Hor.seley v. Hilburn, 44 Ark. 458; Myar v. Snow, 49 Ark. 125; Wilmans
-v. Robinson, 67 Ark. 517.
'1Viris v. Sloan, 68 Il. 588; Lehndorf v. Cope, 122 Ill. 317, 330 (semble);
Kyner v. Boll, 182 Ill. 171, 177 (semble) ; Turner v. House, 199 Ill. 464, 471
(senible).
8 Thompson v. Carl, 51 Vt. 408.
' 2 BL, Coin., Ch. 14, pp. 200-240; 4 Gray's Cases on Property, 9.
"Frame v. Humphreys, 164 Mo. 336; Burris v. Page, 12 Mo. 358.
'This reasoning evidently prevailed over a strong prejudice against the
result which it entailed, for in Rozier v. Graham, 146 Mo. 352, at page 360,
the Court had said: "It might prove interesting to examine and discuss at
length the exceedingly ingenious and plausible argument of the able counsel
for Mrs. Mullen trat our statute of 1835 [Mo. R. S. 1835, Act of Conveyances,
Sec. 5] docking entails has been the means of preserving the common law
rule of descent of primogeniture, but having disposed of the only two grounds
upon which his contention could possibly exist in this case, the stress of
work forbids that we should enter upon such a discussion. While it is some-
what startling, we do not think it is altogether new, and we feel justified
in saying that however plausible the theory evolved from the mere words of
the statute, no such construction ever has been given that statute in this
State, or ever will be. There are no mourners for the doctrine of primo-
geniture in this State."
aI A. & D. R. E. S., 439; also L. 1819, p. 223 (1 A. & D. R. E. S. 446).
"Corbin v. Healy, 2o Pick. (Mass.) 514 (1838); Wight v. Thayer, 67
Mass. 284 (1854).
"Reinhart v. Lantz, 37 Pa. St. 488 (i86o), overruling the earlier case of
Price v. Taylor, 4 Casey (Pa.) 95, xo6, 28 Pa. State 95, io6.
Sauder v. Morningstar, i Yeates (Pa.) 313, is no authority upon the
point of the text because there the statute of descent (Act of 1705) only
regulated the descent of lands amongst children, where the father is seized
thereof, and might dispose of them by deed or will.
"Riggs V. Sally, 15 Me. 408 (1839).
"In Corbin vt. Healy, supra, the statute of descent involved (Mass. Laws
of 178o-1791, p. I24, Act of March 9, 1784) read: "That when any person
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shall die seized of lands, tenements or hereditaments, not by him devised, the
same shall descend in equal shares to and among his children," etc.
In Reinhart v. Lantz, supra, the statute involved (Session Laws of Pa.,
1832-3, p. 315) applied to "the real and personal estate of a decedent, whether
male or female, remaining after payment of all just debts and legal charges,
which shall not have been sold or disposed of by will or limited by marriage
settlement."
"In i Leading Cases in American Law of Real Property (note by Shars-
wood and Budd), io4.
'"The existence and incidents of an estate tail, have always been recog-
nized in this Commonwealth, and provision made for an easy mode of barring
them; and common recoveries to bar them have been in frequent use." Per
Shaw, C. J., in Corbin v. Healy, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 514, 517 (1838). In
Sauder v, Morningstar. i Yeates 313 (1793), counsel who were arguing
that the estate tail descended to all the sons equally were stopped by the
Court. "The Court observed that it was too late now to stir this point
whatever reason there might have been for it in the first instance. The
invariable opinion of lawyers since the Act of I7O5 has been, that lands
entailed descended according to the course of the common law. and it has
been understood generally, that it has been so adjudged in early times. All
the common recoveries which have been suffered by the heirs of donees in tail
have been conformable to that principle; to unsettle so many titles at this
late day would be productive of endless confusion."
4 See language of the Court in Price v. Taylor, 28 Pa. Stat. 95 at io6;
4 Casey 95, 1o6.
"See the suggestion of Lowrie, J., in Price v. Taylor, 28 Pa. St. 95, io6;
4 Casey 95, I6.
'It might be urged that the Act of 1827 itself furnishes an example where
a reference to- the common law admittedly includes a statutory amendment of
the common law, since, while referring to "cases where by the common law
any person or persons might hereafter become seized, in fee tail," cases where
by the statute de donis of Edward I any person is seized in fee tail are meant.
But a fair argument can hardly be drawn from this because the result was
reached not because "common law" includes a subsequent statutory amend-
ment of the common law, but because the statute in terms applied to estates
tail and at common law there were none such at all.
"The Court adds that by the Revision of 1845 "this last vestige of the
system of feudal tenures was swept from our statute book." That is true
because the Act of 1845 referred to must have been Mo. R. S. 1845, p. ii6,
Sec. 5 (Act regulating conveyances), where it was provided that the remainder
"shall go and be vested in the children of such grantee or devisee equally to
be divided among them," etc. But by the Act of i866 (see supra note 6),
this "last vestige of the system of feudal tenures" was evidently restored by
the re-enactment of the Act of 1825 regarding entails. (Frame v. Humphreys,
164 Mo. 336.)
'Laws 1829, p. 191; i A. & D. R. E. S., p. 464, Sec. 46.
'R. S. 'I845, p. 534, Sec. 46.
"R. S. 1874, p. 417, Ch. 39, Sec. r.
'Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57; Welliver v. Jones, 166 Ill. 8o.
"Cooper v. Cooper, supra.
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"Welliver v. Jones, supra.
uRev., p. _-W, Secs. io and ii.
uDoty v. Teller, 54 N. J. L. 163.
"'Zabriskie v. Wood, 23 N. J. Eq. 541; Weart v. Cruser, 49 N. J. L. 475,
480.
. i Hayes' Conveyancing, 543.
'In the following cases the Court said that the Rule had no application
in case of an estate tail: Baker v. Scott, 62 Ill. 86, 98; Griswold v. Hicks,
132 Ill. 494, 5O1; Schaefer v. Schaefer, 141 Ill. 337, 343. In the following
cases the same thing was assumed without mention of the point: Blair v.
Van Blarcum, 71 Ill. 290; Welliver v. Jones, x66 Ill. 8o; Atherton v. Roche,
192 Ill. 252.
"It was also destructable. How far it may still be destructable by means
other than the creation of the preceding statutory estates is not here considered.
"Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, par. loS.
"203 Ill. 341.
'This position was squarely taken by the Court, but it was unnecessary
to the result reached. The only object in calling the remainder vested was
so that it might pass by descent upon the death of the remainder-man. It
would just as clearly have descended if it had been a contingent remainder,
since the death of the remainder-man was not an event which forever made
it impossible for the remainder to vest. (Fearne C. R. 364; Gray, Rule
against Perpetuities, par. 118.) It seems, however, that the position of the
Court that the remainder was vested was supported by the case of Boatman
v. Boatman, 198 Ill. 414.
'Gray, Rule against Perpetuities, pars. lo6-1o7.
"Evers v. Challis, 18 Q. B. 224, 231; 7 H. L C. 531; Gray, Rule against
Perpetuities, pars. 338-34oa. No separation of contingencies can be accom-
plished upon the reasoning if the ultimate interest is an equitable interest in
realty. In re Bence, Smith v. Bence (i89i), 3 Ch. 242.
"This is founded upon the rule that a future interest must take effect
as a contingent remainder rather than as an executory springing or shifting
future interest. (2 Preston, Abs., 153-154.) It is supported by every case
where a contingent remainder has been held to be destroyed because of the
failure of the event to happen upon which the remainder would vest before
the termination of the preceding estate.
0*159 Ill. 300. There the rule of the feudal law of remainders that a fee
cannot be mounted upon a fee by way of remainder triumphed over the
later rule of conveyancing under the statute of uses that by bargain and sale
a fee might be mounted upon a fee by way of shifting use.
nI59 Ill. 300.
7202 Ill. 275.
"Forth v. Chapman, I P. Wms. 663; 5 Gray's Cases on Property, 256.
"'Smith v. Kimbell, 153 Ill. 368; Hinrichsen v. Hinrichsen, 172 Ill. 462.
"Theobald's Law of Wills, 563.
ni07 Tenn. 54.
'203 Ill. 341.
'The usual expression seems to have been "for default of such issue."
288 YALE LAW JOURNAL.
2 Greenleafs Cruise on Real Property, 666; Hayes and Jarmen, Forms of
Wills (8th ed.), 388.
79i Vic. c. 26 s. 29; Leake, Digest of Land Law, 183; Theobald on Wills,
P. 535; 2 Jarmen on Wills (6th ed.), 1322 (star page).
'2 Hill 554; 2 Denio 336.
8'2 Denio 336.
'The language of the will in this case was particularly strong for an
indefinite failure of issue. It read, to Rachel and the heirs of her body forever;
"and in case of her death without such heirs," then to another.
'See also Wilkes v. Lion, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 333, 397 (1823).
